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Could a currency devaluation lead to a trade imbalances improvement had 
always been controversial J-Curve stated that the trade imbalances would first 
be worsened after a currency depreciation followed by an improvement. Yet, 
whether the J-Curve really did exist was also questionable. This paper aimed at 
studying the trade imbalances development between U.S. and the Asian Four 
Dragons，namely Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, after the 
1985 Plaza Agreement to see if any empirical evidences existed in supporting 
the two controversies mentioned. No observed relationship between exchange 
rates and trade balances was found in all the four cases. On the other hcmd， 
there were possible existence of J-Curve in the Singapore，South Korea and 
Taiwan cases. 
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When talking about correcting trade imbalances, one simple and key variable 
which economists, politicians or government officials would like to change is the 
exchange rate. It is a variable that can be easily monitored and will not suffer as 
much attack by the other trading partners as the imposition of trade barriers, 
tariffs or quotas. In the U.S. case, the U.S. govemement has pressured other 
major industrial nations, like Japan and West Germany to cooperate for a sharp 
plunge of the USD with an aim to correct the trade imbalances rather than taken 
the protectionist approach in taking a trade war. 
Could depreciation correct trade imbalances 
A recent yet good example of whether the trade imbalances could be corrected 
under a currency depreciation was the U.S. case for the period after 1985. In the 
period 1980-1985, the USD value was extremely strong under the U.S. Federal 
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Reserve's tight monetary policy. The interest differential between U.S. and other 
major industrial nations like Japan，West Gennany or U.K. plus other factors like ‘ 
decline in U.S. inflation，U.S. economic recovery and, maybe, a perception of the 
U.S. as a safe haven for funds all contributed to the strength of the greenbacks. 
The cost of this was a massive U.S. trade deficit. Under the 1985 Plaza 
Agreement, the G-7 co-ordinated in pushing the USD sharply lower with an 
objective to ratify the U.S. trade problems. Yet，the up-to-date result is still not 
impressive and U.S. is still in a deficit situation. Other examples could be cited 
in which countries, aiming to turn the trade deficit situation around, depreciated 
their own currencies. Nevertheless, whether satisfactory results were found are 
questionable. In chapter II, some empirical results on this topic will be 
presented. 
The U.S. case after the Plaza Agreement was inconsistent with the textbook 
thinking that a devaluation would lead to a correction of the trade imbalances. 
One possible explanation for such a phenomenon the J-Curve effect. It stated 
that the immediate response after a currency depreciation was a worsening of 
trade situation which was then followed by the lagged behind improvement. 
Such a trade development after the devaluation would then be depicted like a 
letter J. A section about the J-Curve theory would be discussed in chapter II. 
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After the sharp depreciation of USD against the major currencies, the U.S. 
government then turned to &e strongly against the Asian 4 dragons, namely 
Hong Kong, Singapore，South Korea and Taiwan and forced them to appreciate 
their currencies, which were then tightly controlled and managed by the 
respective monetary authorities and believed to be undervalued. The aim of such 
an action was to bring the U.S. trade deficit down. 
Objective of the study 
The purpose of this paper is to study whether the trade imbalances between U.S. 
and the Asian 4 dragons were corrected after the U.S. political pressure for 
currency value changes and most important, whether a J-Curve effect could be 
observed. This also serves to complement most of the other studies which 
focused on the trade developments between U.S. and other major industrial 
nations after the 1985 Plaza Agreement. The methodology will be explained in 





Could depreciation improve trade balances 
The conventional perception on this topic is that depreciation will improve trade 
conditions. By depreciating the domestic currency, a country is expected to be 
able to remedy the trade deficit problem it is facing. On the import side，import 
prices in domestic currency term will be inflated which lower foreign products' 
competitiveness in the home market. On the export side, export prices in foreign 
currency term will be lowered which enhance the competitiveness of domestic 
goods in the foreign market, exports thereby will be boosted. The combined 
effects will then be a narrowing of the trade gap. '�� 
Cooper (1971) showed in his studies that out of 24 devaluation，15 demonstrated 
improvement in the balance of goods and services. By improvement, he meant 
either a narrowing of trade deficit or a widening of trade surplus. Nevertheless, 
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there was no indication that this improvement was permanent. Indeed, 10 out of 
the 15 improvements were still negative after the devaluation process was 
completed. 
In another study, Claude Tygier studied the trade patterns between U.S. and 
Japan, West Germany in relation to the YEN/USD and DEM/USD rates 
respectively over the period 1974-1990. His study also aimed to see if there was 
any existence of a J-Curve effect throughout the period. Tygier found that the 
U.S. trade deficit appeared to be caused by an excessive growth in imports as 
compared to exports. The sharp increase of imports from Japan and West 
Gexmany to U.S. did not show any connection to the fluctuations of the dollar. 
They rose when the USD rose but also when the USD dropped. On the export 
side, the idea that exports should have been reduced by a strong USD was not 
supported by his data. And throughout the studies, he could not observe any 
development in the trade pattern in the form of a J-Curve. 
J-Curve Effect� 
_ I • y V 
The J-Curve effect suggested that the trade imbalances of a country would 
deteriorate first after a devaluation before any improvement could be seen. The 
rationale behind was that importers before prices inflated and exporters would 
5 
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hold the exports in the hope of selling in better prices. Magee (1973) explained 
the J-Curve phenomena by analysing the trade responses after the devaluation 
A 
and divided the J-Curve into 3 different stages，the Currency Contract Period, the 
Pass-Through Period and the Quantity Response Period. 
Currency Contract Period 
This period covered the time frame when sales contracts were signed before the 
devaluation but payment was not yet made after the devaluation. One important 
question after the devaluation was whether the contracts were denominated in the 
local currency, USD, or foreign currency. 
Magee assumed that the whole category of import and export were contracted in 
one cuirency，be it local USD or the foreign currency. If both imort and export 
were contracted in USD，then the trade balance in USD term would remain 
iinchange. If export was contarcted in foreign currency, then exporters would get 
more dollar when payment was recevied out of thp USD depreciation which 
meant a trade balance improvement. If import was contracted in foreign 
currency, then the importers would have to pay more after the devaluation which 
meant a trade worsening. In cases of both import and export were contarcted in 
foreign currency, the result on trade balance would depend on the original trade 
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status. An original trade surplus would lead to a greater balance while an 
original deficit to a worsening trade gap. One generalisation which could then be 
made from the above analysis was that the prerequisite for a trade account to get 
worsened under a depreciation in this currency contract period was import be 
contracted in foreign currency. 
Magee did not provide any empirical evidence that imports generally were 
contracted in foreign currency. Michael H. Moffett (1989) listed in his article 
about some of his empirical evidence, though also not conclusive . He pointed 
out that work by Hooper and Kohlhagen (1978) for U.S.-West German trade for 
the period 1965-75 period showed that most countries, including U.S., contracted 
export in domestic currency. From an opposite angle，imports were mostly 
contracted in foreign currency. Nevertheless, another recent study by Giovanni 
(1988) found a substantial of U.S. imports from Japan were contracted in USD. 
Without empirical support about the import contract currency term, it is difficult 
to prove that trade balance necessarily deteriorates after currency devaluation. 
Yet, if the country is running a deficit situation and if most of the import 
contracts are denominated in foreign currency, then the declining segment of the 
J-Curve is possible. 
7 
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Pass-Through Period 
A successful pass through meant that after a devaluation, the import prices in 
domestic currency term would be inflated while export prices in foreign currency 
term would be reduced. Magee evaluated the pass through situation shortly after 
the devaluation in which he assumed the quantities of export and import had not 
yet had time to adjust. Supply might be perfectly inelastic for a while because 
exporters could not instantly alter their output or their sales abroad. 
Alternatively, demand might be perfectly inelastic because importers need 
sufficient time to substitute among other commodities and to change their flow of 
orders. 
If pass through were unsuccessful in both the import and export sectors，it meant 
that export prices in USD term would increase while import prices would remain 
• 
unchanged as exporters were lowering their prices to absorb the effect of 
devaluation. In this case, the trade balances would be imporved bearing in mind 
that quantities had not yet adjusted. \ 
Magee further quoted 2 evidence after the USD took a major devaluation in 
1972. Firstly, U.S. international companies took the USD devaluation as an 
opportunity to boost their profit margin of their overseas affiliates since the latter 
8 
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now paid to their U.S. parent a lower price due to depreciation but still charged 
the old price in foreign currency term in the foreign market. Therefore, it is these 
overseas affiKates which hindered the successful pass through in the export 
sector. Secondly, evidences showed that foreign exporters were permitting 
sizeable cut in import prices in foreign currency term to absorb the impact of the 
devaluation which hindered the pass-through on the import side. And if these 
two evidence permit generalisation, then the U.S. trade balance should improve 
in this pass-through period with import and export quantity still not yet adjust. 
Quantity Response Period 
The two periods aforementioned were Magee's main focus in his paper in 
explaining the immediate deterioration and the followed improvement before any 
quantity adjustment took place. Yet, he hypothesised that a further deterioration 
would emerge at the early stage of quantity adjustment period which would result 
in a W-curve rather than a J-curve. 
/ 
Miles’ Critique on Other Empirical Studies 
Miles (1979) in his article to study the effects of devaluation on the trade balance 
9 
and the balance of payments criticised that 3 basic objections could be made to 
studies about exchange rate and trade balance connections before his. 
1. They examine only the impact effects and fail to show whether any apparent 
improvement is temporary or permanent. By permanent, he meant that the 
studies should take into account what happened to the trade balances after the 
devaluation for a sufficiently long period of time. He did not mention how many 
years were considered to be sufficient. But as he quoted Laffer (1976) studies 
in which a period of 3 years before and 3 years after the devaluation were 
examined as acceptable, a 3 years period could be induced as sufficient. In this 
study, a 7 years period was taken after the devaluation in order to ensure that the 
period after devaluation was sufficiently long enough to capture any correction in 
trade balances. "“ 
2. They do no compare post devaluation levels of the accounts with 
predevaluation levels. Therefore, it was unable to to determine if an 
improvement as compared with the year of the devaluation is also an 
improvement as compared with predevaluation years. In my study, this is 
catered for. 
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3. They had not accounted for the effects of other variables such as the 
government's monetary or fiscal policy. I agreed but also thought that if all 
variables were considered in one study，then what could be obtained was the 
combined effect of all these variables on trade balances. Whether exchange rate 
was playing the role there could never be known. A study in evaluating which 
variable was playing a more important role was then necessary. 
As pointed out in Chapter I，the objective of this study was to see whether the 
trade imbalances between U.S. and the Asian 4 Dragons were corrected after the 
U.S. political pressure for currency value changes and most important, whether a 
J-Curve effect could be observed. Hence, the exchange rate was deliberately 
taken as the single variable to be considered. A further study might be required 
to see whether other variables like interest rate policy or national income were 






In this study, the U.S. bilateral trade balance with each of the Asian 4 dragons is 
studied in association with the exchange rates. A 10 years period from 1982 to 
1991 will be covered with focus on the 1985 Q1 when the Plaza Agreement took 
place and USD started to take a major plunge. 1985 was taken as the timing of 
the USD depreciation against these 4 currencies. 
Data 
Quarterly import and export figures between U.S. and Hong Kong, Singapore 
and South Korea were obtained from the Directio^ of Trade published by the 
International Monetary Fund. The figures are from the U.S. standpoint so export 
means' export to and import means import from the respective countries. The 
trade balance figures，be it a surplus or deficit，are calculated from the import and 
export figures. 
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The currency rates for the above 3 countries were obtained from the Bulletin of 
Statistics published by the United Nations. The whole set of Singapore and 
South Korea figures were obtained there while since the publication did not 
include data for Hong Kong for the period 1982 Q1 till 1983 Q2, tiie figures 
were supplemented by those recorded on Hong Kong Monthly bulletin of 
Statistics published by the Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong. 
Taiwan does not belong to the United Nations so some other sources are tried. 
Both the trade figures and the exchange rates were obtained from the Monthly 
Statistics of the Republic of China, Directorate General of Budget, Accounting 
and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Republic of China. 
The Studies 
Three sets of study were made. 
I. Quarterly trade figures were plotted against the exchange rates over the 10 
years period to review the relationship between exchange rate and trade balances 
and the existence of the J-Curve. If a depreciation &st led to a worsening trade 
gap，followed by an improvement with ultimate trade level improved from the 
predevaluation level, then a J-Curve was found. 
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n. With 1985 as the base year, the percentage change of the trade balances was 
plotted against the exchange rate to see any significant improvement in the 
former after the Plaza Agreement. This aimed to compare the postdevaluation 
trade balances to the predevaluation level to see if any absolute improvement 
took place. 
HI Percentage change of import, export and trade balances were plotted against 
the exchange rates. Breakdown of the trade balances were made to understand 
the development of the trade scenario and also served to review the impact of 








With reference to Table 1.1 and Fig. 1.1，the trade developments between U.S. 
and Hong Kong in association to the exchange rates under the 10 years period 
1982 to 1991 were analysed. HKD/USD rates rose sharply from HKD 
5.8550/USD in 82 Q1 to a high of HKD 8.2000/USD in 83 Q3 due to the. 
political uncertainty created by the Sino-British talks on Hong Kong's fiiture. It 
was expected that Hong Kong would be returned to the Communist China by the 
year 1997 which created a massive outflow of capital from Hong Kong due to the 
political panic. Li order to ease the tension on the TT rates, which is the generic 
term for HKDAJSD rates, the government announced the pegged rate system 
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which linked the HKD to the USD at the rate of 7.8000. Since then, the TT rates 
fluctuated narrowly around the 7.8 level as could be seen on Fig. 1.1. 
Fig. 1.1a showed the fluctuation of the TT rates in a different scale since 84 Ql， 
the first quarter after the peg system was implemented. For most of the time, TT 
was traded within the band of 7.7800 to 7.8200, or a 0.25 % fluctuation from the 
pegged rate 7.8000. A plunge to 7.7635 was recorded in 85 Q2 in response to 
the sharp fall of USD after the Plaza Agreement. 87 Q4 drop to 7.7635 was due 
to the U.S. continuous exertion of political pressure on the Asian 4 dragons for 
currency appreciation. The deviation recorded in 90 Q3 and 91 Q3 were due to 
inflow of capital in view of the bright economic prospect of Hong Kong out of a 
China economic expansion. Yet，even the lowest rate recorded at 7.7440 for the 
10 years period that covered only represented a 0.72 % deviation from the 7.8 
official peg rate. It was comparatively small as compared, to the USD 
depreciation against the currencies of other major industrial nations. 
The trade balance development could be divided into 2 phases. 82 Ql to 87 Q3 
was a gradual rise of the U.S. trade deficit from 658 million to 2,077 million, 
followed by the second phase depicting a gradual improvement of the U.S. trade 
gap with Hong Kong to 724 million. It was also noted that over the 10 years 
period, all showed a seasonal pattern with second half of the year trade deficit 
16 
larger than that of the first half. The reason was probably the U.S. seasonal 
demand for Christmas. 
The politically derived strong USD in the years 82 and 83 did create a worsening 
trade deficit scenario which matched the conventional perception. A closed look 
at Fig. 1.1a also depicted some regularities between the two moving in the same 
direction after the peg system. However, as mentioned before，the fluctuation of 
the TT rates was very small in this period and it was unrealsitic to conclude that 
the exchange rate did affect the trade balance. Probably, some other factors, like 
national income or relatvie price levels, that may affect trade balances are playing 
a more dominant role here. In addition, there is no sign of a presence of the 
J-Curve. 
n 
Fig. 1.2 showed the % change ofHKD/USD rates against % change ofUS/HK 
trade balance with 1985 Q1 as the base period. A positive figure for the % 
change of the TT rates represented an appreciation of the USD and a negative 
figure represented a depreciation. On the other hand, a positive figure for the % 
change in trade balance represented an improvement in the trade gap and a 
17 
negative figure represented a worsening. As a result, if the two moved in 
opposite directions, the conventional theory that a currency depreciation would 
lead to a trade balances improvement was valid. 
After 85，a gradual improvement in the trade deficit situation was reported 
together with a gradual depreciation of the TT rates. Yet, the percentage change 
of TT rates in this period was so small that, again, a conclusive remark about a 
currency depreciation would result in trade balances improvement could not be 
made. 
m 
Fig 1.3 showed the breakdown of the trade balance into export and import 
components and tracked the % changes over the 10 years period. It could be 
seen that the volatility in the trade balance indeed was mainly caused by the 
rising of export after 1987. Exchange rate fluctuation over this period was 
comparatively small so it was impossible to conclude that the export growth was 
/ 
derived from a currency depreciation. Bearing in mihd that the peg rate at 7.8 
indeed was much higher than the level before the Sino British talk, appreciation 
of USD was found with a boost in export which contradicted the conventional 
result. Due to the nature of Hong Kong being re-export centre to mainland 
18 
China, the growth of export throughout this period might likely be associated to 
the rising consumer market in China rather than exchange rate changes. A 
further analysis about this export growth was not covered here as this was not the 







Under the tight control by the MAS，Monetary Authority of Singapore, the 
SIN/USD rates moved with small volatilities. Between the period 82 Q1 to 85 
Q2，SIN/USD moved steadily in the range of 2.1000 to 2.2000, reaching a peak 
of 2.2330 by 85 Q2. Since then, it moved gradually lower, probably in response 
to the U.S. criticism on the manipulated exchange rates.Singapore was pressured 
to appreciate its own currency so as to avoid tougher trade barriers. The rates 
moved from 2.2330 in 85 Q2 to 1.6270 in 91 Q4，a depreciation of the USD by 
27 %. (Table 2.1 and Fig. 2.1) 
The trade balance development could be divided into 3 phases. From 82 Q1 to 
83 Q2，U.S. was running a trade surplus of average about USD 300 million 
against Singapore. Since then till 87 Q35 the trade surplus situation deteriorated 
gradually to a deficit of 724 million. Correspondingly, the SIN/USD rates moved 
pretty stable within the range 2.1 to 2.2，with a mild depreciation after 85 Q2 till 
� / 
87 Q3. Hence, depreciation was found with a deteriorating trade deficit which 
was unconventional. For the period thereafter till 91 Q4，the trade deficit was 
running mostly within the range of 400 to 600 million while at the same time the 
20 
USD continued to depreciate against the SIN. The result violated the concept 
that a depreciation would lead to an improvement in the trade balances. 
For the period 84 Q4 to 90 Q4, there was a sign of a J-Curve effect. Or as what 
Magee had suggested, a possible W-Curve was present. Yet, as the trade 
balances deteriorated sharply after 90 Q4 with the SIN/USD still depreciating， 
the result found here could not match the criterion of a J-Curve in this study. An 
improvement as compared to the predevaluation level was required. One 
possiblity was that the trade balances would remain erratic for a while before 
showing any actual improvement. If that were the case, then a J-curve effect 
could easily last for 10 years or more before any correction of trade imbalances 
could be observed. Then, the taking of devaluation as a tool to correct trade 
deficit situation was pretty inefficient. 
n 
Fig 2.2. showed a continuous depreciation of SIN/USD since 1985. A gradual 
� 
depreciation followed with the pace of depreciation picking up after 1987. Only 
two temporary and exceptional boost recorded in 89 Q1 and 91 Q1 showed a 
trade balances level better than 1985. All the rest depicted a worsening of the 
21 
trade gap under a currency depreciation scenario. In other word，there was no 
absolute improvement in trade imbalances after the 1985 depreciation. 
m 
In Fig. 2.3，both import and export showed a steady and gradual growth under a 
currency depreciation scenario. Export growth with a currency devaluation was 
consistent to the conventional theory but import growth is not. Conclusively, the 
SIN/.USD depreciation in this 10 years period had no relation at all with the 






The WONAJSD rates movement was more interesting than those of the the HKD 
and SIN. The movements could be divided into three phases. It first rose from 
718.30 at 82 Q1 to a peak of 890.20 at 85 Q4. Since then, WONAJSD, hovered 
between 860 to 890 for 1 year before moving lower to 667.20 at 89 Q2. The 
major plunge during this period took place in 87 Ql. The rates moved higher 
again since 89 Q3 to 760.80 at the end of the period that covered. ( Table 3.1 
and Fig. 3.1 ) 
The trade pattern moved almost hand in hand with the exchange rates in the case 
of South Korea under this 10 years period. The trade deficit worsened from 189 
million USD at 82 Ql to 2,857 million in 87 Q3. The peak was found about one 
year after the WON/USD took the major plunge which demonstrated some 
existence of the time lag effect after a currency depreciation. Since then, 
improvements for two quarters were reported, followed by another sharp 
worsening to 2,774 million in 88 Q3. After that, the trade balances staged the 
eventual and remarkable improvement in the trade accounts: 
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A deformed J-Curve effect was found here with a double worsening of trade 
deficit before improvement of the trade imbalances took place. Could it be a 
W-Curve with a right extension? 
n 
• 乂 
The % change comparison in Fig. 3.2 showed similar results. Taking 1985 as the 
base，the WON/USD actually did not follow the major USD plunge after the 
Plaza Agreement. A depreciation was not actually recorded till 87 Ql. A 
W-Curve was easier to be depicted here which yielded some consistence with the 
J-Curve effect, which stated that the trade imbalances would worsen after a 
currency devaluation before improvement could be found. Talking on an 
absolute base, an improvement could also be recorded by taking 1987 as the 




The turnaround of the U.S. and South Korea bilateral trade imbalances was 
accomplished by the change in the export and import growth rate. (Fig. 3.3) 
Export growth peaked in 88 Q3, and a time lag effect existed after the 87 Ql 
24 
depreciation. Yet, this produced an encouraging result to the textbook theory. 
After 1987, depreciation was much faster than before. However，import 
continued to rise gradually which was unconventional. 




As mentioned in the section of methodology，the Taiwan figures were obtained 
from the Monthly Statistics of the Republic of China so the figures were reported 
in millions ofNTD. (See Table 4.1) In Table 4.1 a, the export and import 
figures were changed to a U.S. standpoint to match previous studies for the other 
3 countries. Figures in USD were obtained by using the exchange rate to convert 
the NTD figures into USD term. 
In Fig. 4.1, a sharp and obvious plunge of the NTD/USD was depicted but with a 
sharp deterioration of the U.S. trade deficit. The currency movements could be 
broken into 3 phases. Form 82 Q1 to 85 Q4, the exchange rates were moving 
very steadily with a range of about 38.00 to 40.50. It then took a major plunge to 
25.72 in 89 Q3 in response to the Plaza Agreement. After that, the NTD/USD 
moved in a rather sideway market with a range of about 26.00 to 29.00 till end of 
91. ,v 
\ •y 
The trade imbalances dropped gradually from 82 Q1 at 694 million to a low of 
4,615 million in 87 Q3. Even with the sharp plunge of USD after 85，the trade 
gap continued to worsen throughout this period from 85 to 87. An 
26 
unconventional result was again reported here. There was a sharp improvement 
of the trade gap at early 88 with the exchange rates moving rather steadily. 
After this sharp improvement, the trade imbalances moved pretty erratically. 
There might be an existence of a J-Curve given the mentioned sharp 
improvement in trade imbalances. One might argue that a possible improvement 
of the U.S. trade imbalances was on the way because after the sharp correction in 
1987，it was hovering around 1,500 to 3,500 million trade deficit region with 
likelihood to have an eventaul turnaround if more time was allowed. Yet, 7 years 
had lapsed after the 85 sharp plunge of USD value and if a correction of trade 
imbalances took that long, then exchange rate manipulation should not be a 
useful tool for the trade problem. As a result, given the criteria that the 
postdevaluation level had to show improvement as compared to predevaluation 
level, the existence of a J-Curve effect was denied in the Taiwan case. 
n 
y 
In Fig. 4.2，no absolute improvement of the trade imbalances after the 
devaluation could be observed. There were only 3 cases when the trade balances 
were at a better level as compared to 85. During the same period，USD did 
27 
depreciate gradually but the trade balances failed to show any post devaluation 
improvement. 
m. 
The trade balances development was caused by the export changes as shown in 
Fig 4.3. The export changes moved almost hand in hand with the trade balances 
changes. The growth in export was also consistent to a USD depreciation. On 
the import side，imports continued to grow despite a currency depreciation which 






The findings of the study could be summarised as follows : 
I. In terms of whether exchange rates led to a trade balances improvement, only 
the South Korea case showed a positive result. For the other 3 countries, there 
was no obverved relationship between the exchange rate and the trade balances. 
J-Curve effects were possibly found in the Singapore，South Korea and Taiwan 
cases. Worsening trade imbalances were observed for all the three cases “ 
followed by improvements. Nevertheless, the improvements could only bring 
the trade imbalances to levels more or less the same as those when the 
V 
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devaluation took place. Further improvements to bring the trade imbalances to 
levels better than the predevaluation level were not observed. After the 
devaluation, the initial worsening of the trade deficit and the followed 
improvement could be what Magee described as the Currency Contract Period 
29 
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and Pass Through Period. However, it was uncertian how long each period 
would last. In the study, the two periods together last for five to seven years. 
And if these 2 periods really took that long in general, then a policy to take 
exchange rate depreciation as a tool to correct trade imbalances was not efficient 
and effective at all. 
II. There was an eventual absolute improvement of trade balances as compared 
to the predevalution level in the case of South Korea. On the other hand, in the 
cases of Singapore and Taiwan, 110 absolute improvement was observed. In 
Hong Kong case, an absolute improvement was found. However，the magnitude 
was very small and the changes were also reported in a period when HKD/USD 
moved in very narrow range due to the Peg system. Therefore，a conclusion of 
absolute improvement was reluctant to be made in the Hong Kong case. 
m. Both import and export rose in all four cases under a USD depreciation 
scenerio. According to textbook theory, import should fall with a currency 
depreciation but the results in this study contradicted this. Export growth as 
� 
observed in this study matched the conventional thinking. Yet, it did not go hand 
in hand with the USD depreciation except in the South Korea case. Both import 
and export growth were highly likely to be affected by other varibale like 
national income rather than exchange rates. 
30 
Conclusively, the study did not show any observed improvement in trade 
imbalances out of a currency depreciation. The Currency Contarct Period and 
the Pass Through Period, both with quantity not yet adjusted, were observed in 
the Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan cases, though took a really long time. 
What would happen in the Quantity Response Period was not provided by 
Magee. And as an eventual turnaround of the trade deficit situation was not 
observed in these three cases with a possible J- curve effect, a further theoretical 
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TABLE1.1 BILATERAL TRADE BETWEEN U.S. AND HONG KONG 
( IN MILLION OF USD ) 
~ H K D / U S D R A T E S ~ EXPORT ~ I M P O R T ~ " " “ T R A D E SURPLUS/(DEFECIT) 
~ 8 2 Q 1 5.8550 607 1265 ^ 
82Q2 5.9130 627 1353 -726 
82Q3 6.2850 645 1750 -1105 
82Q4 6.5150 576 1528 -952 
83Q1 6.7300 572 1534 _962 
83Q2 7.2000 683 1522 -839 
83Q3 8.2000 621 1843 -1222 
83Q4 7.7900 _687 1925 -1238 
~ 8 4 Q 1 7!8150 : 652 2079 -1427 、 
84Q2 7.8270 816 1892 -1076 
84Q3 7.8250 767 2616 -1849 
84Q4 7.8230 828 2311 -1483 
85Q1 7J980 798 2268 -1470 
85Q2 7.7635 737 1929 -1192 
85Q3 7.7930 618 • 2413. -1795 
85Q4 7.8090 633 2385 -1752 
86Q1 7^140 753 2172 -1419 
86Q2 7.8100 686 2038 -1352 
86Q3 7.8020 761 2567 -1806 
86Q4 7.7915 830 2696 “ 8 6 6 
87Q1 7.7990 . 908 2214 -1306 
87Q2 7.8085 909 2434 -1525 
87Q3 7.8080 1028 3105 -2077 
87Q4 7.7560 1138 2737 -1599 
“ " 8 8 0 1 7.8025 11861 2348 -1162 
88Q2 7.8030 1375 2425 -1050 
88Q3 7.8105 ‘ 1641 3053 -1412 
88Q4 7.8085 1489 2985 -1496 
89Q1 7J875 1463 2237 “ -774 , 
89Q2 7.7965 1781 ‘ 2296 -515 
89Q3 7.8020 1593 - 2874 -1281 、• 
89Q4 7.8080 1467 283Q -1363 
~ 9 0 Q 1 7.8100 1622 2233 -611 
90Q2 7.7875 2003 2275 -272 
90Q3 7.7625 1619 2816 -1197 
90Q4 7.8000 1597 2627、’ -1030 
91Q4 7J950 1936 2058 -122 
91Q2 7.7640 2004 2109 、 -105 
91Q3 7.7440 2127 2776 -649 
91Q4 7.7800 2073 2797 £724 
Source ： Exchange Rate ： "Bulletin of Statistics.". United Nations. 1983-1993 
"Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics." Census and Statistics Department. 
Hong Kong. 1982-1983 
Import & Export: "Direction of Trade." International Monetary Fund. 1982-1993 
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TABLE 1.2 % CHANGE OF HKD/USD RATES AGAINST BILATERAL TRADE 
BETWEEN U.S. AND HONG KONG, BASE 1985 Q1 
HKD/USD ~ % C H A N G E T R A D E BALANCE ~ % CHANGE 
~ 8 5 Q 1 7.7980 000% -1470 0.00% 
85Q2 7.7635 -0.44% -1192 18.91% 
85Q3 7.7930 -0.06% -1795 -22.11% 
85Q4 7.8090 0.14% -1752 -19-18% 
~ 8 6 Q 1 7.8140 0.21% -1419 3.47% 
86Q2 7.8100 0.15% -1352 8.03% 
86Q3 7.8020 0.05% -1806 -22.86% 
86Q4 7.7915 -0.08% -1866 -26.94% 
87Q1 7J990 001% -1306 11.16% 
87Q2 7.8085 0.13% --1525 -3.74% 
87Q3 7.8080 0.13% -2077 -41.29% 
87Q4 7.7560 -0.54% -1599 -8.78% 
88Q1 7.8025 006% -1162 20.95% 
88Q2 7.8030 0.06% -1050 28.57% 
88Q3 7.8105 0.16% -1412 3.95% 
88Q4 7.8085 0.13% -1496 -1.77% 
~ 8 9 Q 1 7.7875 -0.13% : T U 47.35% 
89Q2 7.7965 -0.02% -515 64.97% 
89Q3 7.8020 0.05% -1281 12.86% 
89Q4 7.8080 0.13% - -1363 7.28% 
90Q1 7.8100 0.15%""” 58.44% 
90Q2 7.7875 -0.13% -272 81.50% 
90Q3 7.7625 -0.46% -1197 18.57% 
90Q4 7.8000 0.03% -1030 29.93% 
91Q4 7.7950 - 0 . 0 4 % ‘ ^ 91.70% 
91Q2 7.7640 -0.44% -105 92.86% 
91Q3 7.7440 -0.69% -649 55.85% 
91Q4 7.7800 -0.23% -72A- 50.75% , 
Source : Exchange Rate : "Bulletin of Statistics.". United Nations. 1983-1993 
"Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics." Census and Statistics 
Department. Hong Kong. 1982-H983 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE 2.1 BILATERAL TRADE BETWEEN U.S. AND SINGAPORE 
( IN MILLION OF USD) 
I ~ S I N / U S D R A T E S ~ “ E X P O R T “ I M P O R T T R A D E SURPLUS/(DEFECIT) 
""“82Q1 2.1300 738 513 225 
82Q2 2.1490 791 576 215 
82Q3 2.1950 879 636 243 
82Q4 2.1080 801 549 252 
""“85^1 2.0920 934 ！ 565 369 
83Q2 2.1320 1204 745 459 
83Q3 2.1410 726 766 -40 
I 83Q4 2.1270 895 892 ； ？ 
84Q1 2^880 "832 1016 -184 
84Q2 2.1320 910 980 -70 
84Q3 2.1630 886 1132 -246 
I 84Q4 2.1780 1046 992 54 
85Q1 Z2080 943 1126 
85Q2 2.2330 876 1143 -267 
85Q3 2.1340 859 1066" -207 
I 85Q4 2.1050 799 1078 -279 
86Q1 2?1750 864 1173 -309 
86Q2 2.1900 810 1133 -323 
86Q3 2.1700 882 1287 -405 
I 86Q4 2.1750 824 1291 -467 
87Q1 2?1330 959 1386 _427 
87Q2 2.1220 969 1503 -534 
87Q3 2.0950 991 1715 -724 
I 87Q4 1.9980 1134_ 1791 
2.0040 1255" 1821 -566 
88Q2 2.0410 ‘ 1397 1990 -593' 
88Q3 2.0410 1528 2149 -621 
I 88Q4 1.9460 1590 2265 -075 
89Q1 1^9590 1757 1983 -226 ： 
89Q2 1.9660 1731 2218 -487 
89Q3 1.9600 1878 2400 -522 
I 89Q4 1.8940 1987 2582 -S95 
9551 1.8840 1824 2305 -481 
90Q2 1.8400 2008 2447 -439 
90Q3 1.7630 2171 2704、、 -533 
90Q4 1.7440 2016 2 6 4 0 、 ^524 
~ 1 . 7 9 6 0 2418 2343 . 75 
91Q2 1.7690 2382 2472 -90 
91Q3 1.6840 1907 2569 -662 
I 91Q4 1.6270 2101 2833 ； £732 
Source ： Exchange Rate ： "Bulletin of Statistics.". United Nations. 1982-1993 
Import & Export: "Direction of Trade." International Monetary Fund. 1982-1993 
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TABLE 2.2 % CHANGE OF SIN/USD RATES AGAINST BILATERAL TRADE 
BETWEEN lb_S. AND SINGAPORE, BASE 1985 Q1 
~ S I N / U S D % C H A N G E T R A D E BALANCE % CHANGE 
~ 8 5 Q 1 2.2080 0.00% ^ 0.00% 
85Q2 2.2330 1.13% -267 . -45.90%^ 
85Q3 2.1340 -3.35% -207 A2>M°/o 
85Q4 2.1050 -4.66% -279 -52.46% 
~ 8 6 Q 1 2.1750 -1.49% -309 -68.85% 
86Q2 2.1900 -0.82% -323 -76.50% 
86Q3 2.1700 -1.72% -405 -121.31% 
86Q4 2.1750 -1.49% _ 1 5 5 . 1 9 % 
""“S7Q1 2.1330 -3.40% '-427 -133.33% 
87Q2 2.1220 -3.89% -534 -191.80% 
87Q3 2.0950 -5.12% -724 -295.63% 
87Q4 1.9980 -9.51% ^ 5 7 -259.02% 
~ 8 8 Q 1 2.0040 -9.24% -566 -209.29% 
88Q2 2.0410 -7.56% -593 -224.04% 
88Q3 2.0410 -7.56% -621 -239.34% 
88Q4 1.9460 -11.87% -075 -268.85% 
89Q1 1T9590 -11.28% -226 -23.50% 
89Q2 1.9660 -10.96% -487 -166.12% 
89Q3 1.9600 -11.23% , -522 -185.25% 
89Q4 1.8940 -14,22% ^ 9 5 -225.14% 
90Q1 1^840 -14.67% -481 -162.84% 
90Q2 1.8400 -16.67% -439 -139.89% 
90Q3 1.7630 -20.15% -533 -191.26% 
90Q4 1,7440 -21.01% ^ 2 4 -240.98% 
91Q1 1?7960 -18.66% 75 140.98% 
91Q2 1.7690 -19.88% -90 50.82% 
91Q3 1.6840 -23.73% -662 -261.75% 
91Q4 1.6270 -26.31% ^ 3 2 -300.00% 
Source : Exchange Rate : "Bulletin of Statistics.". United Nations. 1982-1993 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE 3.1 BILATERAL TRADE BETWEEN U.S. AND SOUTH KOREA 
(IN MILLION OF USD ) 
~WON/USD R A T E S ~ E X P O R T IMPORT~"" “TRADE SURPLUS/(DEFECIT) 
82Q1 718^0 1197 1386 -189 
82Q2 740.80 1417 1521 -104 
82Q3 742.90 1431 1716 -285 
82Q4 748.80 1485 1388 97 
~ 8 3 Q 1 763.40 1426 1542 _ ” 6 
83Q2 776.70 1536 1799 -263 
83Q3 789.30 1439 2258 -819 
83Q4 795.50 1525 2059 -534 ： 
84Q1 791.80 1442 2313 -871 
84Q2 803.40 1606 2462 -856 
84Q3 815.20 1520 3014 -1494 
84Q4 827.40 1415 2238 ^ 2 3 ； _ 
85Q1 85030 1566 2547 -981 
85Q2 873.80 1673 2601 -928 
85Q3 891.70 1407 2920" -1513 
85Q4 890.20 2645 -1334 
86Q1 885^0 1501 2992 -1491 
86Q2 886.60 1583 3174 -1591 
86Q3 877.00 1595 3778 -2183 
86Q4 861.40 1675 3553 -怊78 
87Q1 846.90 . 1746 3701 -1955 
87Q2 808.90 2068 4607 -2539 
87Q3 805.80 2138 4995 -2857 
87Q4 792.30 2147， 4688 -2541 
88Q1 746^0 2506， 4787 -2281 
88Q2 728.30 2760 5059 -2299-
88Q3 719.00 3028 5802 -2774 
88Q4 .684.10 2995 5561 -2566 
~ 8 9 Q 1 671.90 3?18 49?9 -1801 
89Q2 667.20 3470 5121 -1651 > 
8903 670.00 3500 5410 -1910 • 
89Q4 679.60 3391 5143 -1752 
90Q1 702.10 3559 4486 -927 . 
90Q2 716.00 3638 4849 -1211 
90Q3 712.90 3412 5171 k -1759 
90Q4 716.40 3789 4781 、 ^ 9 2 
~ 9 1 Q 4 724-70 4045 4081 “ -36 
91Q2 723.10 3783 4281 -498 
91Q3 741.50 3701 4742 -1041 
91Q4 760.80 3989 4639 ^ 5 0 
Source ： Exchange Rate ： "Bulletin of Statistics.". United Nations. 1982-1993 
Import & Export: "Direction of Trade." International Monetary Fund. 1982-1993 
44 
TABLE 3.2 % CHANGE OF WON/USD RATES AGAINST BILATERAL TRADE 
BETWEEN U.S. AND SOUTH KOREA, BASE 1985 Q1 
WON/USD % C H A N G E ~ TRADE BALANCE % C H A N G E ~ 
85Q1 850^30~~~“ 0.00% ^ ° - 0 0 % 
85Q2 873.80 2.76% -928 5.40% 
85Q3 891.70 4.87% -1513 -54.23%. 
85Q4 890.20 4.69% -1334 -35.98% 
86Q1 885^20 4.10% -1491 -51.99% 
86Q2 886.60 4.27% -1591 -62.18% 
86Q3 877.00 3.14% -2183 -122.53% 
86Q4 861.40 1.31% -1878 -91^4% 
87Q1 846.90 -0.40% -1955 -99.29% 
87Q2 808.90 -4.87% -2539 -158.82% 
87Q3 805.80 -5.23% -2857 -191.23% 
87Q4 792.30 -6.82% -2541 -159.02% 
88Q1 746.20 -12.24% -2281 -132.52% 
88Q2 728.30 -14.35% -2299 -134.35% 
88Q3 719.00 -15.44% -2774 -182.77% 
88Q4 684.10 -19.55% -2566 -161.57% 
89Q1 671.90 - 2 0 . 9 8 % - 1 8 0 1 -83.59% 
89Q2 667.20 -21.53% -1651 -68.30% 
89Q3 670.00 -21.20% , -1910 -94.70% 
89Q4 679.60 -20.08% -1752 -78.59% 
90Q1 702.10 -17:43% ^927 5.50% 
90Q2 716.00 -15.79% -1211 -23.45% 
90Q3 712.90 -16.16% -1759 -79.31% 
90Q4 716.40 -15.75% ^ 9 2 -1.120/。 
~ 9 1 Q 4 724.70 -14.77% 96.33% 
91Q2 723.10 -14.96% -498 49.24% 
91Q3 741.50 -12.80% -1041 -6.12% 
91Q4 760.80 -10.53% ^ 5 0 33.74% 
Source : Exchange Rate : "Bulletin of Statistics.". United Nations. 1982-1993 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE 4.1 a BILATERAL TRADE BETWEEN U.S. AND TAIWAN 
(IN MILLION OFNTD ) 
I NTD/USD R A T E S I EXPORT IMPORT ~ T R A D E SURPLUS/(DEFEClT) 
"""82Q1 3 8 l 3 47185 73636 -26451 
82Q2 39.39 43357 87732 -44375 
82Q3 39.87 45572 90790 -45218 
I 82Q4 39.91 41529 88883 -47354 
s l o i 4004 40605 81578 -40973 
83Q2 40.20 43574 115169 -71595 
83Q3 40.19 48541 130181 -81640 
83Q4 4027 53695 126509 -72814 '.、 
84Q1 39^2 48328 1 2 8 5 1 7 ~ -80189 
84Q2 39.63 49827 162556 -112729 
84Q3 39.18 51505 156817 -105312 
84Q4 39.47 51053 140170 -89117 
85Q1 39^4 50997 129815 -78818 
85Q2 40.01 47072 154629 -107557 
85Q3 40.40 43757 155390 -111633 
85Q4 39.85 47398 148308 -100910 
86Q1 38J7 49136 1 5 8 4 3 4 - 1 0 9 2 9 8 
86Q2 38.09 48626 178167 -129541 
86Q3 36.72 52522 192044 -139522 
I 86Q4 35.50 55121 189892 -134771 
a f o i 34^6 51944 1 7 8 5 6 1 - 1 2 6 6 1 7 
87Q2 31.03 62766 203069 -140303 
87Q3 30.09 57104 195978 -138874 
I 87Q4 28.55 70624 175584 -104960 
28^64 99747 1 5 5 3 4 4 - 5 5 5 9 7 
88Q2 28.90 108870 168673 -59803 
88Q3 28,93 81572 175760. -94188 
I 88Q4 28.18 82296 169175 -86879 glfl 27.41 77295 144720 -67425 — 
89Q2 26.01 82021 162933 -80912 、 
89Q3 25.72 81142 171128 -89986 
I 89Q4 26.17 77481 153327 -75846 
26^40 85033 1 3 3 4 9 8 - 4 8 4 6 5 
90Q2 27.19 86932 144670 -57738 
90Q3 27.30 81925 161040 -79115 
I 90Q4 27.11 85024 143820' -58796 
~ 9 ^ 1 27A7 92958 128820""“: -35862 
91Q2 26.90 98071 146858 -48787 
I 91Q3 26.45 99566 168803 -69237 
I 91Q4 25.74 89192 153172 -63980 • 
Source : "Monthly Statistics of the Republic of China." Directorai General of Budget, 
Accounting And Statistics, Executive Yuan, Republic of China. 1982-1993 
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TABLE 4.1b BILATERAL TRADE BETWEEN U.S. AND TAIWAN 
( IN MILLION OF USD ) 
~ N T D / U S D R A T E S E X P O R T ~~IMPORT ~~TRADE SURPLUS/(DEFECIT) 
""”82Q1 3 0 3 1237 ~ 1 9 3 1 ^ 
82Q2 39.39 1101 2227 -1127 
82Q3 39.87 1143 2277 -1134 
82Q4 39.91 1041 2227 -1187 
~ 8 3 Q 1 4004 1014 2037 -1023 
83Q2 40.20 1084 2865 -1781 
83Q3 40,19 1208 3239 -2031 
83Q4 40.27 1333 31i42 • -1808 , 
~ 8 4 Q 1 39.92 1211 3219 -2009 
84Q2 39.63 1257 4102 -2845 
84Q3 39.18 1315 4002 -2688 
84Q4 39.47 1293 3551 -2258 
" ”85Q1 39.54 1290 3283 -1993 
85Q2 40.01 1177 3865 -2688 
85Q3 40.40 1083 3846- -2763 
85Q4 39.85 1189 3722 -2532 
""”86Q1 38J7 1267 4087 -2819 
86Q2 38.09 1277 4678 -3401 
86Q3 36.72 1430 5230 -3800 
86Q4 35.50 1553 5349 -3796 — 
~~87Q1 • 34^26 5212 -3696 
87Q2 31.03 2023 6544 -4522 
87Q3 30.09 1898 6513 -4615 
87Q4 28.55 2474 6150 -3676 
~ 8 8 Q 1 28J64 ~3483， 5424 -1941 
88Q2 28.90 , 3 7 6 7 5836 -2069-
88Q3 28.93 2820 6075 -3256 
88Q4 28.18 2920 6003 -3083 
~ 8 9 Q 1 27.41 2820 5280 -2460 ~ 
89Q2 26.01 3153 6264 -3111 、 
89Q3 25.72 3155 6653 -3499 • 
89Q4 26.17 2961 5859 -2898 
90Q1 26^40 3221 5057 -1836 
90Q2 27.19 3197 5321 -2124 
90Q3 27.30 3001 5899 -2898 
90Q4 27.11 3136 5305、：•、 -2169 
""“91Q1 2 M 7 3384 4689 ^ -1305 
91Q2 26.90 3646 5459 -1814 
91Q3 26.45 3764 6382 -2618 
91Q4 25.74 3465 5951 -2486 
Source : "Monthly Statistics of the Republic of China." Directoral General of Budget, 
Accounting And Statistics, Executive Yuan, Republic of China. 1982-1993 
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TABLE 4.2 % CHANGE OF NTD/USD RATES AGAINST BILATERAL TRADE 
BETWEEN U.S. AND TAIWAN, BASE 1985 Q1 
~~NTD/USD % CHANGE TRADE BALANCE ~ % CHANGE 
85Q1 3 9 . 5 4 ~ 0.00% -1993 -0.02% 
85Q2 40.01 1.19% • -2688 -34.88% 
85Q3 40.40 2.18% -2763 -38.64% " 
85Q4 39,85 0.78% -2532 -27.06% 
- 8 6 Q 1 3 8 J 7 ~ " “ -1.95% -2819 -41.45% 
86Q2 38.09 -3.67% -3401 -70.64% 
86Q3 36.72 -7.13% -3800 -90.65% 
86Q4 35.50 -10.22% -3796 -90.49% 
87Q1 34.26 -13.35% - 3 6 9 6 ~ -85.44% 
87Q2 31.03 -21.52% -4522 -126.87% 
87Q3 30.09 -23.90% -4615 -131.57% 
87Q4 28.55 -27.79% -3676 -84.46% 
88Q1 28^64 -27.57%"""" -1941 2.60% 
88Q2 28.90 -26.91% -2069 -3.83% 
88Q3 28.93 -26.83% -3256 -63.36% 
88Q4 28.18 -28.73% -3083 , -54.69% 
89Q1" 27341 -30.68% ”""-2460 -23.43% 
89Q2 26.01 -34.22% -3111 -56.09% 
89Q3 25.72 -34.95% -3499 -75.55% 
89Q4 26.17 -33.81% -2898 -45.42% 
90Q1 26^40 -33.23% ~ -1836 7.89% 
90Q2 27.19 -31.23% -2124 -6.55% 
90Q3 27.30 -30.96% -2898 -45.41%. 
90Q4 27.11 -31.44% -2169 -8.82% 
91Q1 27A7 -30.53% “ - 1 3 0 5 34.50% 
91Q2 26.90 -31.97% -1814 9.00% 
91Q3 26.45 -33.11% -2618 -31.34% 
91Q4 25.74 -34.90% -2486 -24.72% 
Source ： "Monthly Statistics of the Republic of China." Direct.oral General of Budget, 
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